Military integration of former enemies : Do previous identities matter for the creation of a new "we"?

Military integration of rebels has become a more common feature in post-civil war contexts. Despite this, little attention has been given towards explaining the continuation of intergroup violence within some integration processes. This thesis examines why intergroup violence continues in some military integration processes, but not in others. The theoretical framework focuses on identity, and applies Jeremy Weinstein’s concept of rebel group resource base, to the post-civil war context. The argument entails that military integration processes that include rebel groups that are based on social endowments, and thus have strong group identities, will be more likely to experience intergroup violence. Rebel groups based on economic endowments have a weaker common identity, and will thus be easier to integrate. The method of structured, focused comparison is supplemented with process-tracing in the cases of Zimbabwe and Mozambique. A variety of sources are used, including scholarly articles and bibliographies. The findings lend some support to the theorized relationship, but more research is needed due to data limitations and the existence of alternative explanations